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Abstract
The development continues for Finite State Abstraction (FSA) methods to enable Impacts Analysis (IA) for cyber attack against power grid control systems. Building upon previous work, we successfully demonstrated the addition of Bounded Model Checking (BMC) to the FSA method, which constrains grid conditions to reasonable behavior. The new FSA feature was successfully implemented and tested.
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FSA is an important part of IA for the power grid, complementing steady-state approaches. It enables the simultaneous evaluation of myriad dynamic trajectories for the system, which in turn facilitates IA for whole ranges of system conditions simultaneously. Given the potentially wide range and subtle nature of potential control system attacks, this is a promising research approach.
In this report, we will explain the addition of BMC to the previous FSA work and some testing/simulation upon the implemented code using a two-bus test system. The current FSA approach and code allow the calculation of the acceptability of power grid conditions post-cyber attack (over a given time horizon and for a specific grid topology). Future work will enable analysis spanning various topologies (to account for switching events), as well as an understanding of the cyber attack stimuli that can lead to undesirable grid conditions.
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Introduction
The IA program at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is continuing to investigate modeling of power system dynamic behavior caused by cyber attacks using FSA. Last year's work (detailed in reference [1] ) successfully analyzed a two-bus model and converted its continuous-time-domain representation into a finite state system. A significant missing feature of the previous work is an inability to evaluate the acceptability of the system with bounded inputs (the former work has assumed unbounded inputs); this is successfully addressed in the FY09 work using a BMC approach.
Research Goals
The goal of the FSA research is simply to improve the tractability of grid dynamic analysis under cyber attack conditions. The space of attack possibilities is very high and is not solvable exhaustively, even when considering only the power system's static model (although we can sort this space heuristically). Adding the element of time to the problem makes impossible the evaluation of any significant part of the potential system dynamic trajectories. Current practice involves selecting one (or at best a very few) dynamic grid responses for analysis.
The FSA approach changes all of this. Assuming that we can sort the grid's permutations into interesting and uninteresting groups, we can apply the FSA to the former in order to immediately and exhaustively evaluate all of the dynamic response trajectories associated with any grid topology (for a given time horizon). There are many existing approaches for the sorting problem, but to date there has not been an way to approach the dynamic analysis. The FSA method fills this need, and it is a necessary enabling complement for effective IA.
Project Deliverables
The budget for the IA project in FY09 was $100k, and four deliverables were proscribed:
• Metrics for grid performance that work effectively with FSA,
• Sensitivity analysis technique for selected grid control setpoints,
• Test algorithms on representative systems, and
Each was met successfully (this document is the final item), with one caveat: the proposed sensitivity analysis for control setpoints was not tested due to unexpected budgetary pressures caused by the difficulty of implementing BMC in the FSA code. We will address the development of the first two requirements in the next section, although each of these are predicated on the development of BMC. That need was identified late in the FY08 research cycle, and the bulk of the work in FY09 was spent in addressing this requirement. The details of the testing are included in the subsequent chapter.
Chapter 2 Theoretical Development
Clearly, the goal of the FSA work is to understand the potential impacts to the Electric Power Grid (EPG) caused by malevolent cyber attack. To this end, we presume that a successful cyber attack against some control system will introduce a perturbation on the grid (through some cyber to physical linkage, see [2] ). The effects of the perturbation will evolve dynamically within the grid, and may negatively affect load and generation.
For example, consider a potential cyber attack against the trip settings of a cyber-based distance relay for an electrical transmission line. (A distance relay constantly checks to see if an electrical line has touched the ground -which would be unsafe -by measuring the impedance between the line and ground. If the measured value is less than the the impedance of the line itself, then there is a fault. Although this is a simplified explanation, it will suffice for examples in this report.) If an attacker were to lower the trip threshold on the relay such that a period of elevated load (rather than an actual fault) caused it to trip a line, then the conditions where power is delivered to the load may become unacceptable (the voltage too low, perhaps).
Algorithm Formulation
The goal of the reachability analysis for dynamical control systems is: Given an initial region x 0 (a dense set) in state-space R N , compute whether a "bad" state Z (described in terms of power grid metrics) can be reached in a specified time horizon T . One can imagine many ways to do this but we can immediately eliminate as impractical for all but trivial systems the idea that we could simply and directly simulate an endless number of trajectories with initial conditions in x 0 and see if they reach Z for times t < T . Therefore we settled on the FSA approach developed explicitly by Giorgetti, Pappas, and Bemporad [3] that involves no direct simulation of the system and in principle is able to provide a rigorous algorithmic proof of the acceptability (or not) of the system given x 0 , Z, and T . We employed an implementation in Matlab 1 of [3] developed by one of the authors (Gardiner [4] ), in collaboration with R. Colbaugh [5] .
Helpful pedagogical discussions (with illustrations) can be found in [5, 6, 7] which we won't reproduce here; instead we'll note some of the key assumptions employed in this study. We employ throughout the framework of the FSA. In order to directly apply Gardiner's implementation of [3] , we transformed the continuous-time nonlinear system representing the power grid (and potentially some of its control laws):ẋ
into a discrete-time linearized (affine) system to obtain the following hybrid dynamical control system [4] :
for each discrete state q, where the discrete-state region is defined by a group of linear inequalities C q x ≤ d q . Physically discrete states correspond to different configurations of the power grid that result from constituent elements in-service or not, e.g., lines or generators switched on or off. Each row of C q , d q is a constraint that represents a half space, with the intersection of all the constraints forming a polytope in state space. Generally, if a constraint is violated, the system switches to a different q, but in this study, we studied only reachability of a constraint violation, so we stopped the calculation when either the first constraint violation or the time horizon was obtained. In effect our Z is the other side of the polytope defined by the constraints. The state variables have been rewritten as x to highlight the fact that the algebraic variables have been eliminated by rewriting them in terms of state variables.
The FSA formulation as written in equation 2.3 is slightly different from previous work in the IA program, as it enables BMC, whereby the constraint set can be checked for all t < T for a range of u. The power grid application of this is that potentially variable grid conditions (like uncertainty in terms of the actual loads, generation, or setpoints) can be represented as ranges in u and evaluated for constraint violations (bad states, indicating success to a cyber adversary) all at once, rather than by individual dynamic simulations.
Metrics for Grid Performance
The following metrics are considered for scoring FSA scenario evaluations:
1. Amount of load supplied: This may be less than the desired amount (either active or reactive power) as a result of automatic load curtailment, outright disconnection, or system instability.
2. Delivery frequency at loads: .Due to control system attack, the frequency of the AC voltage at one or more loads may be off-nominal for a significant interval.
3. Delivery voltage at loads: Attacks may limit reactive flow in the power grid to cause off nominal load voltage (meaning more than 5% off-nominal).
4. System lack of stability: The grid interconnection encounters significant periods of poorly controlled evolution.
While this is not intended to completely cover the full range of potential metrics, they will serve as a foundation for the analysis in this report. The current metrics are more suited to load delivery points; future work will consider better metrics for generator sites.
Sensitivity Analysis for Control Setpoints
FSA is suited to analyzing many types of cyber attacks. In many cases, we can assume that an adversary will cause outages on constituent elements for the power grid. A more subtle attack would be to alter the control setpoint inside one or more grid control devices.
The FSA technique has been evaluated for its suitability to analyze these subtle attacks, and there are significant advantages here. Using conventional analysis, the effects of the altered control can be evaluated pretty accurately, but each potential set of grid conditions must be considered individually.
As an example, consider the distance relay setting mentioned above. A dynamic grid simulation can determine the system dynamic trajectory based on a single set of grid conditions, after which the results can be scored based on some pre-supplied set of metrics. In contrast, the FSA method allows the advantage of understanding the reachability of Z for ranges of potential operating states. In the long run, we would like to investigate the possibility of parameterizing the control system setpoint itself, and calculate a critical value which allows Z to become reachable.
Chapter 3 Testing and Results
The two-bus test model is shown in Figure 3 .1. For future reference we'll note that
the generator is set to 1.025 (for descriptions of these variables, please see [1] ). With both lines in service, the stable equilibrium conditions and values for the system variables are: We would like to analyze the sensitivity of the system with respect to setpoints for these hypothetical distance relays under differing ranges of system inputs/conditions. For this demonstration we studied one kind of perturbation, i.e., the possibility of extra reactive power demand ∆Q L . Additional reactive power (unless accompanied by proportionate extra active power) reduces the power factor that in turn drops the voltage below acceptable levels. The FSA demonstration shows that for this model only a modest ∆Q L /Q L ≥ 8% is required to do this. We suspect that the actual lower limit is actually below the one we obtained but for purely numerical (not theoretical) reasons we were unable to obtain the lowest ∆Q L needed to cause system failure (see the Recommendations section).
Therefore we considered only q corresponding to both lines active (leaving the question of control point sensitivity for future work). We chose for constraints 1 that V 1 , V 2 ≥ 0.95. We also set B 0 = 0 and obtained A 0 and ∆x by expanding around the steady state solution x 0 of the nonlinear dynamics of the two-bus model.
We took as the perturbation to the system the addition of pure reactive load ∆Q L , i.e.,
because a positive ∆Q L lowers the power factor that in turn can lower at least one of the bus voltages.
Again, the equations for x and y can be generally represented aṡ
where x ∈ R n and y ∈ R m . We won't here "drive" the system with the input u, so here u will just be a parameter and q = 0 (both lines in service). The first step in converting (3.3, 3.4) into a pure linear Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) is to linearize around an equilibrium (x 0 q , y 0 q ) and substitute, as follows:ẋ = f x ∆x + f y ∆y (3.5) 0 = g x ∆x + g y ∆y (3.6) where, e.g., ∆x = x − x 0 q and f x is the Jacobian
evaluated at (x 0 q , y 0 q ); here we confine our attention to q = 0. If g y is invertible 2 then we can solve for ∆y to get the n dimensional linear dynamics 3 
The constraints that we care about are in ∆y = H∆x. In particular the constraints whose violation cause a "bad" state are 0.95 ≤ V 1 and 0.95 ≤ V 2 . As a consequence of the linearization and (3.9) we need only for both H (1) ∆x and H (2) ∆x (where H (k) is the k th row of H) to be less than or equal to 0.95, a requirement easily accomodated in the half-plane description of the constraints (i.e., C q x ≤ d q ). Now we have the two-bus model in the form (2.3) that we need in order to apply [3] to the reachability question, i.e., given a set X 0 in X (the state space), is the set Z where the voltage constraints are violated reachable in a finite time horizon T ?
We studied the initial set generated by
, a ten-vertex polytope in the five-dimensional state space X. First we verified that with no perturbation (i.e, ∆Q L = 0 in Eq. 3.2), no violation of the constraints (i.e., no overlap of X 0 with Z) occurs for time horizons as long as T = 1000 seconds 4 . Then with ∆Q L = 0.0029, i.e., 8% of the equilibrium value for Q L , the constraint on V 2 was violated in 4s. This value of ∆Q L is most likely not the lowest ∆Q L to cause a constraint violation in a reasonable time but it is as low as we could go due to the numerical difficulties in the evaluation of X 0 at subsequent discrete time steps. A fix for these difficulties is the subject of proposed work. Of course, higher values of ∆Q L cause violations in even less time. Each of these calculations took at most a few seconds on an Intel-based laptop running Matlab.
Chapter 4 Conclusions
As we noted in the introduction, no amount of direct simulation would exhaustively check trajectories for constraint violations, but with this approach based on FSA, only a few seconds of processing time on a laptop running Matlab is enough to rigorously verify reachability of bad states over long times and for all trajectories emanating from the initial conditions. The bad states are characterized in terms of conventional grid metrics like voltage, system stability, etc. The current code implementation is not yet robust enough to allow sensitivity analysis for control setpoints, but the algorithm is certainly amenable to doing so.
Chapter 5 Recommendations
The demonstration that we have accomplished here gives us the confidence to recommend:
• Revise code to increase numerical robustness
• Revise code to automate features that are now manually controlled
• Discovery of precursors to failure states
• Discovery of recovery paths from failure states As mentioned in the Testing and Results, there are numerical sensitivities that for this particular two-bus model (and the selected perturbation) limited the range and the ease with which we could obtain results. These singularity-like sensitivities (e.g., dimensional reduction of the initial set) have been encountered before in other applications [5] of this code. Avoiding these and other well-understood numerical problems will likely require revisions of the Matlab test code, which (to be fair) was intended only as a test of the feasibility of these sort of calculations and not a final, numerically robust product. Furthermore, the code could made easier to use by automating certain features that are now manually controlled by the user. We did not here exploit the ability of the present code to answer questions other than reachability. For example, this approach permits us to explore recovery scenarios not attempted here. This approach also permits us to discover precursors to failure states, which also wasn't attempted here.
Appendix B
Acronyms, Symbols, and Abbreviations varies Jacobian of f with respect to x at equilibrium Continued on next page The FSA approach represents a possible method to determine the stability and suitability of operations for an electrical power grid utilizing a fully descriptive model (including dynamics and control action) under a wide range of potential cyber attack scenarios. The underlying premise for this work is the conversion of the hybrid grid/control model dynamics into a representative FSA, which greatly improves the tractability of the problem. The new approach is expected to scale to larger systems and modeling complexity much better than traditional analysis for grid dynamics.
